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Australia and New Zealand provide a unique set of comparators with which to examine 
similarities and differences in approaches to the regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
By examining experience with regulation of FDI in these two states we show how they act in 
the governance space to enable state directed regulation and how these states differ in their 
approach to regulation. In particular, we focus on the influence of cultural norms in shaping 
metagovernace responses from each of the states. Textual analysis of the treatment of 
investment in bi-lateral discussions associated with Closer Economic Relations (CER) 
demonstrates that political, social, cultural and institutional factors are integral to modelling 
the challenges faced by national governments in regulating FDI. 
 
Introduction 
Renewed concerns about the regulation of foreign direct investment has arisen in the 
context of globalisation and specifically the growth of investment in services trade 
and the rise to prominence of China as a major source of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). The former has advanced due to technological change and falling barriers to 
trade and investment in services; the latter factor is intimately associated with 
China’s rapid growth and its quest for a secure supply of resources. While popular 
discussion of FDI often has an air of urgency attached to it, the development of 
regulatory practices, tend to be gradual and built on past experience. Therefore it is 
worth examining established practices to better understand dynamics of processes 
that lead to the development and implementation of regulation. Such dynamics are 
likely to be most influential in the longer term. 
Current concerns with FDI and its regulation also point to deeper challenges 
in public policy and administrative practice under conditions of globalisation. A key 
challenge is how to theorise the workings of the state at the interface between the 
domestic and the international sphere. The concept of metagovernance is useful as it 
focuses on the "practices and procedures that secure governmental influence, 
command and control‛ (Whitehead 2003: 8) where the authority of government is 
challenged. Such contested spaces of regulation exist where the roles of actors are 
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not clearly defined, as occurs at the interface between national and international 
forms of investment. In such cases governmental influence may rest with actors 
other than the state. For example, the influence of other actors is readily apparent in 
areas such as food standards, standards and compatibility in electronics as well as 
safety in pharmaceuticals (Eising 2007, Newman & Bach 2004). From this perspective 
the state is portrayed as constrained in its actions, however not all observers accept 
this view. The revisionist position on the state under conditions of globalisation (Bell 
& Hindmoor 2009: 190) suggests a continuing role and indeed the necessity for a 
state centric view of metagovernance. They argue that, ‚metagovernance functions 
are the prime responsibility of the state‛ (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 46). This position, 
that assigns priority to the role of the state, fits well with the case of FDI regulation 
in Australia and New Zealand. In this paper we focus on the role of the state in 
enabling the metagovernance of activity associated with the regulation of FDI. 
The paper is structured as follows: an introduction surveys the importance of 
the Closer Economic Relationship (CER) and relationship to FDI in Australia and 
New Zealand. The concerns identified are located in the metagoverance literature. A 
methodology based on grounded theory is outlined and used in the examination of 
documents related to the CER. We offer a brief survey of theories of FDI derived 
from the international business literature highlighting the potential role for 
institutions in this. The formal institutions of the two countries are identified and 
their functions explained before the results of our inductive interrogation of the CER 
related documents are presented. The data derived from this process sees a 
theoretical model emerge and this is presented in schematic form. Finally it is 
demonstrated that hypotheses can readily be proposed for the application of the 
emergent theoretical framework. 
The case of Australia and New Zealand is a particularly interesting one to 
examine because of the longevity of the Australian-New Zealand relationship, the 
increasing integration of the two economies and the role played by the bi-lateral 
trade agreement called Closer Economic Relations. Under the CER, which came into 
effect on 1st January 1983, complementarities between the two economies are 
recognized. Both economies welcome foreign direct investment and subscribe to 
policies of free trade and openness to investment, but both maintain separate 
regulatory regimes for FDI. In turn, trade between the two economies is substantial: 
in 2009 two-way trade was worth A$21 billion and merchandise trade had enjoyed 
and annual growth rate of 6.2 per cent over the previous two decades; and two-way 
investment between the trans-Tasman partners stood at A$97 billion. As the ties 
between the two economies have grown, ongoing dialogue has seen the gradual 
relaxation of investment restrictions. For example, most recently, the level at which a 
single foreign investment proposal is subject to screening by regulatory authorities 
has been raised to A$953 million for New Zealand investments in Australia and 
NZ$477 million for Australian investment in New Zealand (DFAT CER Ministerial 
 3 
Forum Communiqué 2009). In Australia’s case the size of the limit recognises that 
almost no project is rejected – a reason given by the Treasurer for the increase in the 
threshold. From the perspective of New Zealand the asymmetric thresholds reflect 
an acknowledgement of the different sizes of the two economies and the differential 
impact of any quantum of investment on either. 
Australia and New Zealand (NZ) are both small to medium economies 
seeking greater economic openness and a greater accommodation of inflow of capital 
in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). Greater economic openness creates 
challenges for nation states in terms of processes of economic and political 
adjustment as well as building capacity of public sectors to accommodate these flows 
while recognising the interests of all stakeholders. Since the implementation of the 
CER the significant growth in trade and investment has led to much greater 
integration of these two economies. While the effects of CER on trade and monetary 
issues have been well studied the implications of CER and the associated integration 
of the economies by means of FDI has attracted less attention. Discussion within 
New Zealand is increasingly centred on the prospect of a Single Economic Market 
(SEM); as yet such discourse does not enjoy the same wide currency in Australia.  
Nevertheless, both countries have similar concerns regarding their external 
economic relationships and confront similar dilemmas in monitoring and managing 
inward foreign direct investment. Strong similarities in their administrative and 
political traditions invite not only comparative analysis but the refinement of 
existing perspectives complemented by the study of differences. 
The relationship between the two countries carries a regional significance, 
although the CER only approximates the degree of regional integration found in the 
agreements underpinning the European Union (EU). In fact the CER shares many of 
the characteristics of the looser associations of the Asia-Pacific region. Lane (2008) 
characterises integration in the Asia-Pacific as a situation where politics takes 
precedence over economics while contrasting this type of integration with that found 
in the EU. Whereas the CER lies in-between, placing a greater degree of emphasis on 
economic priorities than found in the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) but still open to political goals to strengthen broader relations between 
Australia and New Zealand. For example, CER does not have formal dispute 
resolution machinery, but rather relies on inter-governmental discussions and 
facilitation. In turn, the two countries attach a different weight to the importance of 
the CER and appear to be moving towards integration at different rates. Differences 
in size of the two economies mean that New Zealand often appears deeply 
integrated into the Australian economy while the converse is less apparent. For 
example, integration of the labour market is one of the more advanced aspects of the 
relationship: over 548 256 New Zealanders were residing  in Australia in June 2009 
(Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010) while fewer than a fifth of that 
number of Australians are resident in New Zealand. 
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Theoretical framework for FDI 
FDI practices lie on a series of fault lines between politics and business, foreign and 
domestic business and community interests. For example, neoclassical trade theory 
sees regulation as an impediment to the realisation of comparative advantage. 
Nevertheless states to greater and lesser degrees remain engaged in shaping the 
nature of domestic industries and regulation enabling or limiting engagement with 
international markets. If international businesses are seeking a frictionless world 
(Rugman 2008) such state involvement creates ‘sand traps’ at the boundaries 
between the activities of domestic and international business and between 
institutions of individual nation states. A concern of this paper is the extent to which  
the regulation of international capital in the form of FDI, or friction, at these 
boundaries is an obstacle reflecting transaction costs; an aspect of real politick, social 
and cultural factors; or a consequence of differences due to specificities of 
institutions and markets (Narula 2006: 150; Narula 2003). 
The dominant model for understanding FDI behaviour, Dunning’s 
ownership, location and investment (OLI) model, recognises the relative strength of 
each of these factors (Dunning & Narula 1996). In this model the firms seek to 
maximise their advantages in three broad areas of operations: either in ownership of 
‚exclusive knowledge of a product or production processes‛; location because of 
‚some imperative *such as+ tariff costs, transportation costs or local resources‛ which 
favour production outside a home country market (Walter & Sen: 180); or through 
internalising markets for intermediate products within the boundaries of the firm 
(Dunning 1988: 38). Such a model is grounded in seeking to explain the ownership 
patterns of internationalised production by firms. In the basic OLI model 
government action is associated with interventions through trade policy as the 
means of controlling the use of factors of production (such as natural resources and 
human capital development). More recent international business literature 
recognises the salience of FDI and its governance within states have been elevated in 
importance because of competition between states, especially less developed 
countries, for inward investment (Buckley 2004). Thus, in the past, locations were 
mainly defined or ranked by resource advantage, whereas institutions now have an 
enhanced role in the consideration of the relative attractiveness of competing 
locations (Buckley 2009). 
Within literature on the nature of political economy and the role of 
government there is a much stronger recognition of the influence of government and 
government behaviour on the nature of FDI (Nelson 2009). This literature 
accommodates the interaction between exogenous and endogenous factors which 
shape FDI, such as those recognised in Dunning’s framework. However, it places 
greater emphasis on the abilities of national governments to influence the volume 
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and mix of FDI flows. Within political economy literature, particularly that drawing 
on experience in developing states, there is recognition of the workings of the state 
as a form of organisation to enable the delivery of public goods, such as regulation of 
FDI (Cummings & Norgaard 2004; Chang 2004;). The focus on political economy 
stresses that institutional practices and regulations created and enforced by the state 
arise from interaction between the state, wider society and, in the case of FDI, 
domestic and international business (Sadleir & Mahony 2009). For example, the 
manner in which the state exerts its pre-eminence is through ‚national policies, legal 
conventions and norms of social and political behaviour over those of other 
groupings‛ (Grindle 1996: 8); and types of regulatory practices and the 
administrative procedures accompanying such practice (Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000). In turn, such capacities both shape and are shaped by historical experience, 
economic circumstances, political preference, social conditions and culture. Focusing 
on institutions, practices and regulations provides an insight into the differences in 
the dynamics that shape such metagovernance capacities. 
 
Methodology 
Empirical and descriptive approaches offer only partial explanations of why there 
are differences in approaches to FDI between the close neighbours, Australia and 
New Zealand.  There remain several puzzles and nuances in regulations that cannot 
be accounted for by the relative size of the two markets nor explanations related to 
stages of development or the structure of production within either country. The 
apparent commitment to open trade and investment, evident in both countries, 
makes these differences in approaches to FDI all that more compelling. To explore 
the reasons for the different experiences with the regulation of FDI we sought to 
define ‚rich substantial and relevant data‛ by the application of the approach of 
grounded theory (Charmaz 2006: 18). The inductive method is associated with the 
approach of Glaser & Strauss 1967). It allowed us to focus our data and to build an 
inductive theory ‚through successive levels of data analysis and conceptual 
development‛ (Charmaz 2008: 204). 
To do this documents associated with CER over several decades were closely 
examined and interrogated. Given the extended history of the CER and that the 
relationship is well documented the topic was most amenable to the textual analysis, 
focused coding and derivation of emergent data and theory.  Extensive and close 
scrutiny of the CER documents and communiqués saw the emergence of recurrent 
themes in the official texts and discussions related to CER, and the Single Economic 
Market between Australia and New Zealand. Themes and descriptors emerged by 
means of coding we applied to the data. The process generated both substantive 
theory specific to the empirical case of CER and formal theory that relates to more 
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general propositions associated with the regulation of FDI (Glaser & Strauss 1967: 
32-35). 
The data derived from examining the documents and the associated emergent 
theory are presented in Tables 1 and 2 below. However, before discussing these 
results we briefly review the mechanisms for the regulation of FDI in the two 
countries. In doing so we set out the context of the CER for each country, 
emphasising key principles related to the regulation for foreign direct investment 
found in the formal governmental institutions for this activity in Australia and New 
Zealand. 
The CER and Institutions for FDI 
An important facet of globalisation is integration of regional as well as global 
markets (Rugman 2008). In spite of the significant integration of the Australian and 
New Zealand markets the coordination of regulatory frameworks for FDI flows has 
proved more difficult. The apparent difficulties and hesitation in developing a 
uniform approach to FDI reflects a wide range of political, administrative, social, 
cultural and economic influences on governmental practice even in this case of two 
similar economies where there is overt political support. 
The CER agreement does not include a specific chapter on investment, nor are 
there specific provisions on investment but it has facilitated cooperation between 
Australia and New Zealand on the issue of investment (Austrade 2009). Recently 
there has seen a more coordinated approach by the two governments in announcing 
the lifting of limits on inward FDI.  However, the CER allows significantly larger 
Australian investments into New Zealand while avoiding parity between the 
countries in terms of the different thresholds for the review of FDI proposals in each 
country. The most likely reflects NZ sensitivities to the large takeover by Australian 
interests (Skilling 2007, Scott-Kennel 2004, Akoorie 1996) and the relative size of the 
two economies. 
Liberalisation of FDI by Australia and New Zealand is best seen as evolving 
within an international context emphasising increasing economic benefits, including 
greater efficiency, from enabling freer flows of capital, particularly FDI ( Okamoto 
1996). However, claims as to the potential gains to economic efficiency of FDI have 
had to confront popular concerns in both countries and the distinctive regulatory 
frameworks in both countries reflect such concerns. Both adopted projects to 
deregulate and liberalise their economies from the 1980s and faced some opposition 
or at least reluctance to such policies from elements of their domestic polity (Castles, 
Curtin & Vowles 2006). Opposition to FDI was associated with the special position of 
agriculture in the economy, the issue of land access and land rights; maritime, 
coastal and lakeshore issues in New Zealand and Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander land rights in Australia. These specific characteristics, with an intensity of 
 7 
feeling and political impact that varies across the Tasman, highlight the difficulties 
of any wider regional or multilateral liberalisation of investment. Support for free 
capital mobility under any regulatory regime needs to recognise individual country 
differences, cultural specificity and context. Nevertheless, CER has seen a degree of 
institutional coordination across the Tasman in areas such as company law and 
competition policy and to some extent in taxation and social security policy. In all 
these areas, it is fair to say, that progress toward coordination, let alone uniformity 
has been gradual. However, mutual goodwill is clear: ‚In the spirit of CER, Australia 
and New Zealand have agreed to avoid to the fullest possible extent the imposition 
of new restrictions on investors and have confirmed that trans-Tasman investment 
should be subject to minimum constraint‛ (Austrade 2009). 
However, on both sides of the Tasman, government agencies pursue 
objectives guided by the policies of their governments. In New Zealand Overseas 
Investment Office (OIO) replaced the Overseas Investment Commission (OIC) in 
2005. The move from the OIC, which was administratively part of the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand, to the OIO, which operates within Land Information New Zealand, 
recognizes the evolution of FDI regulation. Applications for consent from overseas 
persons who want to invest in sensitive New Zealand assets are subject to 
assessment by the OIO. The shift in portfolio responsibility for the FDI screening 
function recognised the evolution of FDI regulation from concerns related to foreign 
exchange to the reality that the majority of applications had to do with land 
acquisition or change to land use. 
In Australia, the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), within the 
Treasury examines proposals by foreign interests to undertake direct investment in 
Australia and acts in an advisory capacity to the Treasurer. Its recommendations are 
based on whether proposals are suitable for approval under the Government's 
policy. Such a capacity emerged from debate in the mid 1960s and early 1970s in 
Australia on how to respond to growing inflows of investment, whilst protecting 
national interests. Such national interests were seen at times to be the need to restrict 
foreign ownership of agricultural land and mining rights. The FIRB is at times seen 
as lacking in transparency because of the emphasis on ‚national interest‛ criteria and 
considerable limits as to the kind of information it can provide publicly.  However, 
the Board does perform an important function as the focal point for decision making 
on FDI proposals at a national level. While much of the advice it provides is to the 
senior minister responsible for foreign investment decisions, the Treasurer, is not in 
the public domain it serves a crucial function in providing a means for scrutiny and 
review within government of FDI proposals.  
An Emergent Theory of Regulation of FDI under CER 
 The interrogation and analysis of the documentation and discussion related 
to CER saw a wide range of themes emerge. Synthesising the results of the two 
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country comparison shows that Australia and New Zealand have both pursued 
policies of economic openness while developing and maintaining regimes to 
regulate the nature of foreign investment. In turn, there are a range of factors 
mediated by the working of the national government in both countries which shape 
each country’s willingness and ability to absorb foreign investment. These factors are 
set out in Table 1 with an assessment of the impact of those factors on aspects of 
regulatory behaviour around FDI. 
For example Table 1 sets out the practices arising from the interaction 
between cultural norms (which both support and work against greater economic 
integration) and the institutional or metagovernmental adaptations made by 
governments in New Zealand and Australia. Such practices define approaches to 
specific regulatory activity on foreign direct investment. 
Table 1 
Tone and Substance of FDI Regulation in Australia and New Zealand 
 NORMS 
 Openness Indigeniety Identity Equity 
Australian 
FDI 
regulations1,3 
Security: concerns 
to restrict access to 
strategic materials 
Ambivalent 
position on nuclear 
energy  
Land rights:  
concerns with 
native title 
Languages of 
regulation: legal 
and economics  
Government 
administrative 
practice: codified 
practices of review 
for inward FDI.  
National Interest: 
Evolving 
interpretation 
Rents to native title: 
not guaranteed but 
negotiated 
Human rights 
issues: 
Native/land 
issues. 
Multicultural 
strengths/assets 
Legal systems: 
supportive  
Nationalism: both 
overt and muted  
 `Fair go’ to local 
entrepreneurs in 
face of global 
giants 
Company laws:  
move to uniformity 
across sub-national 
levels of government 
National  autonomy 
: pursuing economic 
openness but 
willingness and 
capacity to assert 
independence 
 Areas where strict 
FDI controls apply 
due to perception 
of national 
identity: 
agricultural land, 
Management and 
business practices: 
international 
business operating in 
Australia  subject to 
domestic policy and 
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residential land laws 
New 
Zealand FDI 
regulations2,3
,4 
Security:  food 
security, food 
quality/purity/green 
Anti-nuclear 
consensus 
Land rights: 
Maori Treaty, 
codified, right for 
rents to Maori – 
guaranteed 
Language of 
regulation: 
Tension between 
economic and NZ 
identity 
Government 
Administrative 
practice: codified 
practices of review 
for inward FDI   
National Interest: 
Emphasis on 
`sensitive’ New 
Zealand Assets 
 Settler society 
emphasising 
centrality of 
exportable, small 
scale agricultural 
production 
Legal systems: 
supportive  
Nationalism: 
protective of small 
state  
Maori land issues Some commercial 
enterprises out of 
bounds: e.g. 
Auckland Airport, 
Air NZ 
Company laws: 
selective protection 
provided by 
cooperative 
structures (e.g. 
Fronterrra) 
National  
autonomy: 
pursuing economic 
openness but 
willingness and 
capacity to assert 
independence 
 Areas where strict 
FDI controls apply 
due to perception 
of national 
identity: 
agriculture, 
foreshores of lakes 
and maritime  
Management  & 
business practices: 
international 
business operating in 
NZ  subject to 
domestic policy and 
laws 
Sources: 
1 Foreign Investment Review Board Annual Reports, (1995-96 to 2008-09); Sadleir 
and Mahony 2009; Sadleir 2007 
2 Overseas of Investment Office, Land Information New Zealand, 
http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, The Australia – New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship,  
2005, www.mfat.govt.nz 
3 Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian Government, CER Joint Ministerial 
communiqués, various 2003 – 2010. 
4 Lloyd 1991, 2002; Akoorie 1996; Ministry of Economic Development Review of 
Investment New Zealand 2007. 
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Comparing points of commonality and divergence between the two systems 
shows four major categories which we identify as openness, indigeniety, identity, 
and equity. The category ‚openness‛ combines concepts of security, national 
interest, nationalism and national autonomy. Attitudes embedded in the 
institutional architecture governing the treatment of each of these concepts 
determines the degree of openness each state brings to bear in making decisions on 
FDI in general and on specific proposals for FDI projects. For example, both 
countries have defined economic openness as a key policy to pursue and this is 
reflected in the relative openness to FDI flows in both countries. Political and 
institutional commitments to laws on FDI are generally supportive of the 
internationalisation of domestic economic activity. Foreign owned business 
operating in domestic markets in Australia and New Zealand are subject to the same 
laws as domestic business operating in these markets; and both countries restrict 
some forms of foreign investment in ensuring that perceptions of national identity 
are respected. Thus, openness, and a nuanced understanding of how it is made 
operational, is a trait shared across both systems. 
 
However, there is greater divergence in the areas labelled indigeniety, 
identity, and equity. ‚Indigeniety‛ refers to the significance and value placed on the 
recognition and accommodation of the rights of indigenous peoples in the regulation 
of FDI. Here we use the degree to which the principle of prior indigenous ownership 
of land is recognised and the willingness of the state, and its laws, to compensate 
indigenous owners for alternative uses of that land. In the case of Australia and New 
Zealand, NZ shows a stronger approach to both acknowledging prior indigenous 
ownership of the land and well established means of accommodating the concerns of 
the Maori people in decisions on land use and fair compensation through the state 
for changes in land use related to specific FDI projects.  ‚Identity‛ refers to views 
and attitudes of those in the general population of each state, based on languages of 
regulation (more or less emphasis on economics and legality as opposed to generally 
accepted norms for land use or industry) the degrees of emphasis placed on the 
acceptance of general human rights; and subsequent constraints or restrictions on 
types of FDI. Last, ‚equity‛ captures the degree to which institutional arrangements 
seek to balance international investor interests against those of domestic concerns. 
For example, are foreign investors treated in different ways from domestic interests 
and if so why? Given the emphasis on the fair go in both Aust and NZ both systems 
have oscillated from a strong emphasis on privileging domestic interests through 
controls on ownership to the contemporary of approach of placing domestic and 
foreign firms largely on the same legal footings. 
 
In each of these three areas there are striking divergences in consequences for 
the cultural and social protections incorporated into each country’s approach to FDI 
regulation. For example, NZ maintains much stronger commitment to directly 
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enabling the protection of indigenous rights in terms of land use and coastal 
resources by Maori. In contrast, Australia places the onus is on indigenous groups 
seeking surety over land tenure to negotiate agreements on native title. Thus, while 
both countries are committed to greater harmonisation of FDI regulation, social and 
cultural factors present a challenge for both countries in the achievement of this 
policy goal.  This also extends to the recurring challenge in both systems of the 
relative transparency of the screening process. 
 
The importance of these categories is that they identify the social and political 
constraints that are embedded within the rules for determining or testing specific 
foreign investment proposals. For example, in New Zealand there remains a 
protective attitude evidenced by a five hectare maximum on land acquisition before 
it is reviewed by the OIO. Even with this minimum, the prospect of land 
consolidation and issues of control, environmental concerns are common. Among 
the justifications for maintaining the five hectare trigger for the review of proposal is 
that rural land has traditionally allowed roaming for walkers and this may not be 
respected by incoming owners. Similar examples arise in Australia such as where 
local concerns have shaped regulatory controls on FDI on mining; the recognition of 
the land rights of indigenous communities; and most recently the rules and 
conventions regarding prudential supervision to ensure the stability of the financial 
system. 
 
Emerging from the review of the Australian and New Zealand approaches to 
FDI is the importance of recognising norms as a key mediator of government intent.  
Government intent in this context is best understood as a stated commitment to a set 
of public policy objectives underpinned by a specific political philosophy or 
ideology. An example of such a position, relevant to experience in Australia and 
New Zealand, is a commitment to free trade and capital mobility. In terms of 
metagovernance, the intervention of governments into this regulatory space brings 
authority to make regulation, but also brings in a set of embedded norms which 
limit and constrain the use of the regulations. 
 
The dyadic relationship between norms and constraints drives the nature of 
policies on foreign investment in these closely related economies and the 
interchange between the two economies.  Table 2 demonstrates this interaction: for 
example in Country A, the intent of its government is necessarily moderated by the 
accepted social norms and practices of Country A, generating different forms of 
institutions, practices and regulation. Such localised forms of metagoverance, means 
that we observe differentiated engagement with FDI between countries. 
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Table 2 
Norms and Government Intent: the Emergence of Institutions, Practices and 
Regulation 
  
Norms 
 
 
Government Intent 
 
Country A 
 
Institutions, Practices 
and Regulation 
 
Country B 
 
Institutions, Practices 
and Regulation 
 
Implications of the Model 
The model set out in Table 2 implies institutions, practices and regulation will filter 
foreign investment decision making and thus shape the volume and composition of 
such investment. It is an iterative process where the actual type, size, source and 
timing of FDI will impact on government intent. As argued above the decisions on 
investment proposals made by governments and the frameworks of laws created by 
governments highlight underlying norms. These are most evident where that intent 
is challenged or modified. 
Applying this to the case of the CER shows that the melding of two sets of 
institutions into one as might be intended under CER (and broader bilateral and 
regional trade agreements) appears a task faced with considerable difficulties.  This 
research shows that while there is a commitment to work co-operatively, significant 
challenges remain in more closely integrating the FDI regimes of two nations. 
While it would seem obvious that different norms are apparent in two 
countries it is important to investigate the implications of those differences. In the 
case of Australia and New Zealand these differences explain why the CER marks 
only a gradual progression towards economic integration. Where regional 
arrangements are successful, or growing in importance, they are accompanied by 
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regional or supranational arrangements which enable the resolution of conflict 
between norms and the subsequent harmonisation or reshaping of institutions, 
practices and regulations across different jurisdictions.   
The sand trap at the national border where international investment runs into 
domestic institutional arrangements provides both a source of conjecture and a 
laboratory for examining experience at the interface between business and 
government. There are mixed views internationally on this.  As a general rule 
international business expects only a minimalist role for national governments in the 
area of FDI regulation (Salai-i-Martin 2009). On the other hand, experience in the 
transition economies in Eastern Europe show the necessity for there to be some form 
of regulation to enable consideration and responsiveness to national circumstances 
to be recognised and, at times, protected (Bohle & Greskovits 2007). 
In the case of both Australia and NZ while there is a commitment to greater 
harmonisation of trans-Tasman investment laws, such laws and the political 
autonomy to establish such laws, are unlikely to be traded off in the near future. This 
experience suggests harmonisation in FDI laws and practices in the Asia Pacific 
region should be monitored for progress. An outcome of this paper is a framework 
which enables better scrutiny of current regimes and their potential for 
transformation.  The schema identifies factors which contribute to the complexity 
faced by states with open economies. Exploring the nuances of this apparent 
complexity suggest possibilities for better developing state capacity to manage or 
mitigate the effects of engagement with processes of globalisation. The schema 
suggests that testable hypotheses can be generated to evaluate processes of 
engagement with foreign investment. One clear candidate for a testable hypothesis is 
the observation that variance in inward FDI practices between countries is related to the 
degree of transparency regarding decision making on, and attitudes, to sensitive national or 
cultural issues. For example, the differences in the treatment of native title in 
Australia and the rights of Maori regarding land tenure and use in New Zealand 
suggest an area for developing test of this hypothesis in future research. 
The inductive model developed here could be applied and extended beyond 
the example of a two country relationship to include a range of countries. For 
example, regional relationships and regionalism are increasingly offering new 
opportunities and challenges for academics and policy makers. Applying the model 
developed here to a wider range of countries offers promise for analysing the 
prospects of greater regional co-operation. 
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Conclusion 
Despite the CER both Australia and New Zealand continue to respond to domestic 
economic and political contingencies in their management of FDI. Both had projects 
to deregulate and liberalise their economies from at least the 1980s onwards and 
faced some opposition or at least reluctance to such policies from elements of the 
domestic polity. Opposition to FDI was based on collectivist motives, nationalism, 
and identity associated with the special position of agriculture in both economies. In 
turn, there are significant differences between Australia and New Zealand 
concerning land access and land rights - maritime, coastal and lakeshore issues in 
NZ and land rights in Aboriginal Australia. Such differences provide a basis for 
further developing a line of research into this area and it relationship to FDI 
performance in both countries. 
In this paper an attempt has been made to explore the CER and the processes 
around that agreement in order to develop theory to help in understanding of the 
relationship between FDI and the governance arrangements in the two countries. 
Even with two countries which share similar histories and political institutions, and 
close economic and cultural ties, it is has been shown that there are significant 
differences that are reflected in approaches to and the treatment of inward FDI. 
More broadly this experience suggests that the liberal ideal that international capital 
mobility, as a natural complement to trade liberalisation, can be advanced in the 
wake of the success of trade liberalisation needs to be advanced with some caution. 
Its realisation at times appears constrained by social and political obstacles as well as 
obfuscation on the part of politicians. The case for its implementation needs to be 
clearly made especially at a time when outside the happy isles of Australia and New 
Zealand the advent of international financial crisis provokes greater opposition to a 
more highly integrated global economy. However, even under the most benign 
global economic environment the supporters of free mobility of capital, in the form 
of FDI, will still find that implementation of a frictionless world for transnational 
capital cannot easily be achieved. 
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